INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades the ability of national governments to regulate economic practices in ways that might be considered health-promoting has been reduced by two interrelated phenomena: the dominance of a neoliberal economic orthodoxy, which emphasizes free (unregulated) markets and a`minimal' welfare state, and the growth in regional and global free trade and investment agreements.
There is mounting evidence that policies based on neoliberal economic theory, including free trade/investment agreements, may seriously undermine public health by increasing social inequalities, depleting natural resources and increasing environmental pollution. This paper calls on the public health community to join in lobbying efforts at national and international fora to include in global trade/investment agreements social clauses.' These clauses, based on existing multilateral declarations monitored by United Nations (UN) agencies, are currently unenforceable. Their attachment to enforceable multilateral trade and investment agreements, however, would help to ensure that the benefits of a global economy are health promoting by dint of being socially just and environmentally sustainable. This paper begins by defining and critiquing some of the basic tenets of neoliberal economic orthodoxy which underpin the push towards global free trade and investment agreements. It then describes the current status of these agreements, and provides examples of how such agreements might imperil public health. It then goes on to discuss the social clause initiative, and concludes by proposing a public health lobby presence at those fora where trade and investment agreements are negotiated and monitored.
NEO L IB ERA L EC O NO M IC O RTH O D O XY
Neoliberalism is both a philosophy of human existence and a theory of political economy. Philosophically, classical and neo (`new') liberalism hold that individual autonomy is the superordinate human goal and that the rational pursuit of self-interest, particularly economic self-interest, is ultimately utilitarian, creating the greatest good for the greatest number (Olson, 1966; Ferree, 1992) .
The political problem for neoliberalism becomes one of ensuring personal freedom against interferences from the collective in the form of state regulation, except in a very limited set of circumstances. Social justice, as a contrasting philosophy and political theory, argues that individual responsibility to others is the superordinate human goal and certain forms of private behaviours, particularly economic or market activities, must be collectively regulated (Frazer and Lacey, 1993; Labonte, 1995) . The political problem becomes one of using state or community norms to ensure that utilitarian goals are also socially just and environmentally sustainable.
Neoliberalism's emphasis on individual autonomy, and the subsequent efforts of its proponents to enshrine in law certain individual rights, has been an important counterbalance to the potential coercive and undemocratic use of power by governments or political leaders (Chapman and Shapiro, 1993) . But the extension of these rights to economic practices, particularly in neoliberalism's arguments for unregulated markets and`welfare state minimalism' (Pierson, 1994) , has come under sharp criticism from those more aligned with a social justice ethic.
The free markets claimed by neoliberal economists as most efficient in achieving`the greatest good for the greatest number' necessarily create losers as well as winners, rendering it quite rational for losers to demand some compensatory regulation (Dahl, 1993) . This is especially so as, even if markets were truly`free' and operated with textbook perfection, their outcomes would still rest on pre-existing inequalities in the distribution of wealth, resources and status between people and place (Smith, 1995) . More importantly, the oft-cited`trickle down' claim of neoliberal economicsÐthat free markets can solve the problem of social inequality by creating wealth that trickles down to all peopleÐis not supported historically (Hettne, 1995; Amin, 1997) .
The past two decades of economic and social policies based on neoliberal orthodoxy, such as privatization of public services, declining government economic regulation and increased free trade and investment, have seen global wealth inequalities more than double (New Internationalist, January 1997). Even among the 29 member nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the so-called rich nations club,' income inequalities over the past decade have worsened in every country but one, and are now at their worst recorded levels in the USA and the UK (Public Citizen, 1997; Reich, 1997) . The one exception (Canada) was not due to a freer or more efficiently functioning market, but to the redistributive effects of health and social programmes and direct income transfers undertaken by the government (National Forum on Health, 1997) .
Markets are efficient means for resource allocation decisions when there is a single, clear goal, and different investment, production or purchase options to achieve it (Daly and Cobb, 1989; Saul, 1996) . This is rarely the case for social or environmental objectives. More importantly, markets are blind to distributive equity and ecological scale (Daly and Cobb, 1989) . They are not, in the absence of government interventions, geared to produce a fair distribution of burdens and benefits, nor to watch guard the sustainability of ecosystems or natural resources.
N EO LI BER AL IS M' S CR I TI Q UE OF TH E WE LFA RE S TAT E
The public health problem with neoliberal economic orthodoxy is less its emphasis on markets as the means to generate wealth than its corollary criticism of government regulation and, in particular, of welfare state programmes designed to buffer the inequalities created by market economics. A complex mix of social programmes and economic and environmental regulatory policies, the welfare state in economically advanced countries arose partly in response to political claims of organized labour, women's groups, ethnoracial minorities and other disenfranchised peoples, partly to mitigate conflicts caused by market-generated inequalities and partly to meet private industry's needs for healthier, better educated workers through publicly financed programmes (Miliband, 1973 (Miliband, , 1987 Skocpol and Amenta, 1986; Pierson, 1994) . The relationship between capitalist economic practices and the welfare state has thus been a contradictory or ambivalent one (Offe, 1984) , with benefits and costs to both sides and various groupings in civil society jockeying to tip the hand of the state in one direction or the other. Over the past 20 years, however, a neoliberal orthodoxy has prevailed in most countries and, with it, an assault on the role of government in regulating economic and social affairs. Pierson (1994) , in an essay on the decline of the modern welfare state, distils neoliberalism's critique to six points. While some of this critique is useful in drawing public attention to inefficiencies or regulatory abuses in government programmes, strong counter-arguments have been raised for each of these claims. Much of governments' present high public debts, for example, were not caused by uneconomic social programmes but by low inflation/high interest rate policies of greatest benefit to global bond markets and banks (Goudzwaard and de Lange, 1994; McQuaig, 1995; Boyer and Drache, 1996) . The most market-driven health care system in the world, that in the United States, is also the most inefficient and expensive (Rachlis and Kushner, 1994) , raising questions about the presumed efficiency of market discipline over public regulation. While welfare programmes have failed to eliminate poverty, the fault is not with these programmes per se. The market-generated income ratio between Canada's wealthiest and poorest quintiles is 22 : 1, but after taxes and transfers this lessens almost fivefold to 5 : 1 (National Forum on Health, 1997).
The modern welfare state can be despotic, yet there is also evidence of its empowering effects for socially disadvantaged groups (Labonte, 1994) . It is not my intent to fully explicate or refute neoliberalism's critique of the welfare state, but only to show that there are holes in many of its assumptions. Economists and political scientists themselves disagree on many of these points. Yet neoliberal economic ideas and anti-state discourse have become an orthodoxy routinely propounded in the mass media with the certitude of à TINA'ÐThere Is No Alternative. Governments must spend less. Governments must regulate less. Market forces must be freed to prevail. This TINA, in turn, is accompanied by two major transformations that most economists agree seriously challenge continuance of the welfare state: technological changes that have displaced the need for unskilled or semi-skilled labour, and the rapid growth of regional and global free trade and investment agreements (Courchene and Stewart, 1992; Uchitelle, 1997) . Different countries have gone down different policy paths in response to the`crunch' of declining employment and taxable wealth required to fund social programmes (Graham and Lightman, 1992) . Early adopters of the neoliberal ideology (primarily anglophone countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Aotearoa/New Zealand, and now increasingly Canada and Australia) rapidly reduced welfare entitlements and minimized state interference in labour market adjustments. Some of these countries have kept unemployment rates relatively low, but only by allowing the increased strength of globalized capital to`discipline' wages downwards, thus increasing health-compromising internal income inequalities (Betcherman, 1996; National Forum on Health, 1997) . European countries, with a stronger history of organized labour and class politics, adopted state interventionist programmes favouring growth in hightechnology, highly skilled jobs, and many still support welfare programmes that redistribute wealth (Pierson, 1994; Gill, 1995; Amin, 1997) . But their unemployment rates are stagnantly high (Streeck, 1996) , increasing public deficits are forcing them towards the same welfare minimalism adopted by those countries with a more explicit neoliberal agenda (Pierson, 1994) and their emphasis on training their workforces to compete better in the elite`knowledge' economy may eventually reduce top-end wages by creating a surplus of over-qualified workers for a diminishing number of positions (Bienefeld, 1996) .
The problem of enduring unemployment and employment insecurity ranks high in both political and public concern in all economically advanced countries. Policy options do exist, including legislation to shorten work weeks and share employment more equitably, or changes in taxation policies that would broaden governments' revenue base and tax wealth in more progressive (redistributive) ways. Detailing such alternatives is beyond this article's scope, if for no other reason than countries vary considerably in the existing repertoire of policies upon which any reforms would be built. The concern, instead, is that government's political will to enact such alternatives has been tempered by the dominance of the neoliberal orthodoxy, and may now be forcibly constrained by the new regime of international free trade and investment agreements.
ECO N O MI C G LO BA LI ZA TI O N A N D FRE E TRA D E/I N VES TMEN T AG REE MEN TS
For much of market capitalism's history, most market activity was confined to national boundaries where labour and the state could exact some reciprocating social duties on capital (Daly and Cobb, 1989) . This is less so today in an increasingly globalized economy. Globalized trade is not a new phenomenon, but its pace has increased dramatically in the past 30 years, outstripping growth in economic production. This means that international trade has become an increasingly important means by which corporations generate profits. Indeed, over 40% of global trade actually takes place between different parts of the same transnational corporation (New Internationalist, November 1997), where each transaction becomes a means of adding profit. Part of the reason for this is that the nature of international trade has changed. Whereas transnational companies once produced goods entirely within one country or plant and then marketed them abroad, today companies are increasingly dividing the different stages of commodity production between many nations. This allows them to take advantage of, for example, design or technical knowledge in one country (usually a First World country) and low labour costs in another country (usually a Second or Third World country). The resulting growth in corporate economic power has been phenomenal. Today, of the world's 100 largest economies, 50 are transnational corporations (New Internationalist, November 1997).
Accompanying this growth in trade, however, has been corporate dissatisfaction with the old regime of tariffs on imported goods through which national states once protected their domestic industries. When corporations based all of their production within one country, these tariffs were to their advantage. Now that they no longer do so, they are a disadvantage. In 1947, the average tariff on manufactured imports was 47%. Under international free trade agreements, it is set to fall to just 3% (New Internationalist, November 1997). This global free movement of goods and services, proponents argue, should benefit poorer countries with their comparative advantage of lower labour costs. This may be true in theory, but there are two problems with this argument.
TH E WO RLD TR AD E O R GA N IZ ATI O N
First, some reductions in global income inequalities may be achieved by ensuring freer markets for the textiles industries of poorer countries, which are large-scale employers (OXFAM, 1996) . But, revealingly, textiles are one of the goods still excluded from free trade agreements, allowing wealthier countries to impose stiff tariffs to protect their indigenous textile industries (Amin, 1997) . (Trade in textiles is governed by a complex quota system that will not be phased out until 2015.) Most trade actually takes place within transnational corporations or between the so-called`Triad' (North America, Europe, Japan/Upper Income Asia), with the single exception of manufactured goods requiring unskilled labour (Petrella, 1996) . Between 1980 and 1990, for example, the world's share of trade in manufactured goods for the Triad rose from 63% to 72% (exports) and 68% to 72% (imports), while for the poorest 102 countries it fell from 8% to 1% (exports) and 9% to 5% (imports).
Projections of long-term winners and losers from liberalized trade agreements place the Triad strongly in the black, and Africa, Lower Income Asia (e.g. Indonesia, India) and the Mediterranean countries in the red (Voluntary Services Overseas, 1996) . By the year 2000, for example, sub-Saharan Africa is expected to lose $1200 million annually from its current level of trade (New Internationalist, November 1997).
Second, even if free trade did benefit poorer countries, the equitable apportioning of its benefits would depend upon strong government policies aimed at wealth redistribution. The chimera of global competitiveness, fostered by free trade agreements, appears to be working against this. Recently, both South Korea and Hong Kong repealed labour legislation in the name of making their workforces more`competitive.' Similar arguments have also been made by politicians in the world's most economically advanced countries. The one exception to this pattern may be the European Union (EU), and its attempt to develop a supranational social charter (the`Social Chapter' on labour rights) alongside its liberalized trade agreements. This task, however, has proved difficult and so far there is little evidence of declining individual or regional income inequalities within the EU (Streeck, 1996; Amin, 1997) . Even if the Social Chapter were enacted and gradually expanded beyond labour rights, it would require imposing tariffs on goods imported from poorer nations and restrictions on capital mobility, both of which are, or will be, disallowed under liberalized trade and investment agreements.
Free trade agreements may also imperil national policies to protect the environment (Hettne, 1995; Boyer and Drache, 1996) . A GATT panel ruled in 1991 that the USA could not ban imports of Mexican tuna on the basis that Mexican drift-net practices violated US environmental regulations and endangered dolphins. While not disagreeing with the American argument, the panel declared the import baǹ protectionist.' The initial ruling by GATT's successor, the WTO, affirmed that free trade agreements are likely to accelerate this deregulation pattern. The USA was told it could not ban gasoline imports from Brazil and Venezuela because they failed to meet US clean air legislation but, instead, that it would have to amend its environmental legislation or face retaliatory trade sanctions worth $150 million a year (Schrybman, 1997) .
TH E MU LTI LAT ERA L A GR EEME NT O N I N VES TMEN TS
Investment agreements, which already form part of NAFTA, are now being negotiated on a more global scale by the member nations of the OECD. Called the Multilateral Agreement on Investments, or MAI, negotiations are expected to be completed by April 1998. Non-OECD countries are expected to begin to sign on shortly after, although whether the MAI becomes part of the WTO or is administered by a separate multilateral body is still being debated. The pressure for poorer nations to comply with the MAI will be great.
Presently, most foreign direct investment (FDI) flows between OECD nations and, while the share of this investment for non-OECD countries has increased in recent years, most of this share has gone to just a few countries, such as China (New Internationalist, November 1997).
The intent of the MAI is to create a single regulatory framework for investments, the global flow of which has grown faster than trade (New Internationalist, November 1997). The agreement rests on two principles: (i) non-discrimination, meaning governments must treat investment the same regardless of where it comes from, and (ii) assured protection for investors, meaning governments cannot expropriate the assets of foreign investors without market-valued compensation.
The agreement legally limits how and when nations can set investment policy. Governments, for example, will be required to treat foreign investment the same as domestic investment, and will not be allowed to impose performance requirements on investors. Some of these requirements, such as setting affirmative action or hiring quotas for local workers, targeting specific regions or sectors for investment/development, or legislating that some portion of profits must be reinvested locally, have been used by governments in the past to ensure that social benefits arise from foreign, primarily transnational corporate investment. The MAI also adds one new power to investors and corporations that they do not have under WTO agreements: they will have the right to sue national governments before international tribunals for failure to deliver on all of the MAI's benefits. This is the first time any international agreement effectively elevates private corporations to the same status as nations. Once again, these tribunals will be closed and their decisions binding. Also, unlike WTO agreements, which cover only those trade items specifically mentioned in them, the MAI is like negative option advertising. Only those items, or`exemptions,' specifically mentioned will be outside of the agreement (CCPA Monitor, April 1997).
Under draft MAI provisions, national governments would lose their ability to direct foreign investment to particular sectors of the economy based on social or environmental objectives, or to give preferential treatment to local economic initiatives. If Mexico, for example, wanted to offer low-interest loans to local farmers to produce value-added products such as confectionery items, canned foods, boxed cereals or prepackaged meals, it would have to offer the same lowinterest loans to transnational giants like Kraft or General Foods. These provisions could make it almost impossible for local businesses to develop in poorer countries. Even such traditional public health issues as tobacco control could be undermined by these agreements. Under GATT, the predecessor to the WTO, the USA forced the Thailand government to repeal its public health law banning all tobacco imports. The ruling allowed Thailand to continue a ban on advertising and public vending machines because the intent was not to impede free trade but to protect public health.
Under the MAI, the intent of national legislation is no longer what tribunals will consider. Instead, they will rule only the effect: does the national regulation discriminate against foreign investment or trade in any way? Some analysts fear that foreign tobacco companies could use the MAI to sue governments over tobacco control policies that discriminate in favour of existing or domestic brands (Public Citizens, 1997) . This is not idle speculation. NAFTA is presently the only multilateral agreement allowing foreign investors to sue national governments that have signed it, and is the`test' model for the MAI. As soon as NAFTA was approved, the US-based Ethyl Corp launched a suit against the Canadian government for $350 million in damages (`expropriated' potential profits) due to that country's ban of the fuel additive, MMT. This ban was undertaken on the grounds that MMT is known to increase toxic automobile emissions and may cause human health problems. Ethyl will argue its case behind closed doors. No health or environmental organization will be able to intervene. The eventual ruling will be final with no opportunity for appeal. Similarly, a US hazardous waste company is suing Mexico for lost profits due to regulatory delays in granting it an operating licence, owing to Mexico's concerns that the proposed site is not environmentally safe. Again, the eventual ruling will be made in secrecy and will be binding (Schrybman, 1997).
The MAI could also make it more difficult for governments to fund social programmes or redistribute wealth. As Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade admits, governments the world over [must now] compete aggressively for foreign investment' which requires`convincing a foreign investor to choose Canada over other locations' (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1996) . Part of this`convincing' lies in reducing tax burdens to attract investment (Public Citizens, 1997). The proposed MAI, by making it easier for investment to move from country to country, increases this`competitive pressure.' Moreover, to tax wealth, it must remain more or less within national boundaries. The proposed MAI would give investors greater freedom to move profits out of countries, possibly to`tax haven' nations, reducing even the amount of potentially taxable wealth that remains.
CO N FRO N TI N G`TI N A'
In the absence of international public regulation of this unfettered flow of goods, services and capital, social inequalities and environmental degradations are likely to worsen. This poses a new challenge for public health activists.
Most`healthy public policy' work, where it is being undertaken, is directed locally in a defensive reaction against national or subnational policies that capitulate to global capital (i.e. organizing opposition to neoliberal attacks on welfare state programmes). Or it may be directed proactively in efforts to build stronger coping ties and informal economies between the poor and middle class. But the environmental aphorism, think globally, act locally,' may no longer pertain to environmental and human health threats posed by economic markets and investment system that now operate globally. As Hart argues, the realms of production, exchange and consumption have largely escaped from the effective regulation of the territorial nation-state, while the people who make up that state remain largely attached to it. . . . Globalization is pointing to the need for global governance . . . a re-alignment in the authority exercised by or through extra-national rules and institutions. (1996, p. 7) There is a pressing need to find ways to regulate global capital by imposing reciprocating social responsibilities that would permit the recreation of health promoting welfare state policies (Hettne, 1995; Betcherman, 1996; Amin, 1997) . As capital is now global, these policies must also be global, or at least supranational (Bienefeld, 1996) . The problem becomes: how can civil society, represented through its nation-state institutions, regulate a global market, when all of its abilities to do so remain locked within national legal and policy frameworks? TH E`S OC I AL C LA US E' C AM PAI G N For many years, the answer to this question focused on reform of the UN and its many agencies, which should remain an important focus of activity (Amin, 1997) . Certainly, there are many progressive multilateral agreements the UN has announced over the years, e.g. the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the International Labour Code, Agenda 21 and the AlmaAta Declaration. These agreements focus on the responsibilities of national governments for human rights, social welfare and environmental protection. Different UN agencies have responsibility to monitor national enactments of these declarations or codes within national policies. But, unlike the WTO and the MAI, these agreements lack any enforcement measures and the only power UN agencies have for national compliance is moral suasion.
Ironically, if this article's analysis of the impact of these trade/investment agreements is correct, the ability of most nations to comply with voluntary social and environmental agreements will actually decrease. This asymmetry between enforceable agreements for business interests but unenforceable agreements for social or environmental interests has led many NGOs to begin to posit a second answer to the question of how to regulate a global economy: use the WTO and MAI agreements, which are currently written to benefit the interests of capitalists and investors, as opportunities for re-uniting the false schism between economic development, social development and environmental protection. Specifically, an international NGO movement is building in support of appending`social clauses', such as UN agreements on labour, human rights and the environment, to trade and investment agreements. These currently unenforceable agreements would become enforceable by having access to the same penalty measures in place for the WTO or MAI.
Lobbying on this idea began at the December 1996 first Ministerial Conference of the WTO. With the support of organized labour groups and other public-interest NGOs, OXFAM advocated that the WTO strike a Working Group to look at incorporating the International Labour Code within its agreements. OXFAM emphasized the need to move slowly in such incorporation, noting that for many countries, particularly poorer nations, the task of coming to terms with current WTO agreements is already straining their policy resources. But there is no reason why, over time, additional UN social and environmental agreements might not also be incorporated within WTO agreements, or appended to the MAI.
The WTO and whatever regulatory body is established to monitor the MAI would not be responsible for overseeing implementation of these social clauses. UN agencies with mandates for these conventions would maintain their monitoring responsibility, but would have at their disposal the enforcing powers of the WTO and MAI. These enforcement powers may have to be amended somewhat, to include sanctions by all signatory nations against non-complying countries, binding on both trade (excluding humanitarian) and investment. But this is no different than bilateral and multilateral agreements used against politically`renegade' countries, such as Iran or, historically, the former apartheid South Africa.
Despite initial support from several European countries and the USA, the December 1996 initiative failed. It may strike some readers that US government support for such an initiative flies in the face of its largely neoliberal economic policy platform, to say nothing of its own failure to date to ratify many of the International Labour Code conventions, including its six core standards (Hart, 1996) . Some observers at the Ministerial Conference argue that the USA never seriously supported this initiative, but wished to use it as a bargaining chip for other concessions (International Institute for Sustainable Development, 1996) .
Most of the NGO forces surrounding the WTO and MAI at present are those favouring more liberalized trade and investment agreements. They claim that`the piling on of social causes [in trade and investment agreements] may appear politically expedient, but will be a key cause for divisiveness and dissent within the WTO and thus inhibit progress. . . ' (Czinkota in Minyard, 1996) . As Minyard (1996) argued with respect to the OXFAM proposal,`the ILO [International Labour Organization] exists to deal with labour matters, and the WTO must not become embroiled in such non-trade areas unless it wishes to become, like the UN, overcome with minutiae and bureaucracy'. But these arguments miss the point of the social clause campaign, which is not opposed to global trade or investment, and proposes only to append already existing multilateral agreements on social and environmental policies to the WTO and MAI in order achieve symmetry in compliance measures. Moreover, there are precedents. The Montreal Protocol on Ozone-depleting Substances successfully used the`stick' of trade sanctions to obtain rapid national compliance. Even free-trade advocates in the OECD are tentatively exploring the argument that, in such transboundary environmental issues as global climate, biodiversity, desertification and endangered species,`multilateral environmental agreements may need to include trade restrictions', including linking such restrictions to WTO-monitored agreements (Long, 1996) .
Opponents to the OXFAM proposal included several developing countries, and it is here that the proposal to link social clauses with trade and investment agreements requires greater detailing. Part of developing nations' support for free trade and investment reflects the Western education of many of these countries' leaders, education which has been steeped in neoliberal economic ideas for the past 20 years (Amin, 1997) . Liberalized trade and investment, to the extent it opens markets of wealthier countries, may bring short-term hard currency to low-waged countries, even if the longer-term impact is increasing wealth disparities within and between nations.
Many economically developing nations also argue that linking trade to social clauses would discriminate unfairly in favour of wealthier countries which already have welfare infrastructures and considerably more national wealth. Poorer countries would be less able to comply with social clauses, risking First World trade sanctions against their competitive labour advantage. Simply using the enforcement measures of the WTO or MAI for social clauses could paradoxically make life worse for many of the world's poorest.
The case of child labour stands as an example. Several developing countries, particularly those with large textile plants, argue that enacting International Labour Code policies on child labour could force children away from their parents working in factories and on to more dangerous and unsupervised streets. But this is not a`TINA'; it is merely a local contingency that must first be respected if it is to be remedied. As Leslie (1992) argues,`it would . . . be salutary to put policy questions first, and, in light of substantive policy goals, to tackle the more technical and indeed arcane questions involved in the financing of social programs'. Mechanisms for disbursing trade benefits more equitably within and between nations could make it possible for textile factories, to continue with the example, to implement health and education programmes gradually for workers and their families within the factories themselves. These mechanisms would introduce social programmes to the constellation of work and social relationships currently existing within economically developing nations, rather than imposing European or North American models from on high. This principle of`differential compliance' for poorer countries is already recognized in many UN declarations, including agreement on the need for wealthier countries to provide economic and technical assistance to poorer nations to help them achieve compliance. This agreement, however, presently remains unenforceable and, at least in trade-related matters, one effect of the WTO has actually been to foreclose`special and differential treatment for developing countries' (Hart, 1996, p. 8) .
PAR ALL EL G LO BA L PO LI CY AG REE MEN TS
Such mechanisms would likely have to include multilateral agreements on taxation of trade and investment profits in a way that would both stem the flow of capital from poor to rich nations, and create a pool of capital available to poorer nations for endogenous economic and social welfare development (Boyer and Drache, 1996) . For example, growth in global short-term investment and currency transactions has far outstripped growth in international trade or longterm capital investment, posing another significant threat to national welfare policies (Epstein, 1996) . Currency speculators have the ability to earn huge profits playing`casino capitalism ' (Strange, 1986) , but at the expense of determining national currency values and thus the ability of nations to repay debts and earn revenue through trade. Short-term finance markets, aided by microtechnology, now see over $1.2 trillion a day change hands, 40 times more than the value of`liberalized' trade (Helleiner, 1996) . The recent collapse of the Malaysian stock market, and subsequent devaluation of its currency, has renewed calls for implementation of a Tobin tax. Named for the Nobel economist, James Tobin, the tax was originally proposed for foreign exchange transactions, and would be levied at a very low rate of between 0.1% and 0.5%. This would serve to dampen unproductive but highly damaging forms of currency speculation. Proponents are now calling for its extension to other forms of financial investments, such as stocks, bonds and derivatives. If implemented, such a tax would also create a potentially enormous revenue pool that could be used to pay down government debts (especially for poorer nations) and fund compliance with social clauses (Chorney, 1996) .
A so-called`carbon tax' on fossil fuel consumption, creating an international pool of capital derived primarily from disproportionately consuming wealthy nations, has also been proposed, and could be used to finance basic environmental infrastructures (water, sanitation, housing) in poorer nations, as well as transfers of ecologically cleaner technologies.
A GDP-proportionate levy on nations signatory to trade and investment agreements, or a tax on all trade and investment overseen by the WTO, could similarly create a fairly large development fund. The EU's regional economic development funds represent a potential model (Streeck, 1996) , although its many weaknesses, such as economic development superseding social development and countries using the funds to avoid their own internal investment in poorer regions, would have to overcome.
TH E NEE D T O WO RK BO TH N AT IO N AL LY A ND G LO BA LLY
The social clause campaign, to succeed, requires strong national commitments to social equity and ecological sustainability, which perforce requires a political suspension of belief in the neoliberal economic agenda and its anti-state ideology. It also requires that more progressive social movement groups, particularly those within nations, shift their critical stance from opposition to the state, which undermines its legitimacy and therefore its power to stand against the global economic tide, to opposition to the tide that is rapidly swamping it.
Nothing in my argument for work at a global level, particularly at the WTO or MAI, precludes the fundamental importance of organizing within and between nations. Indeed, multilateral trade and investment agreements are still between nations, not above them. The issue becomes one of confronting nations, and the world press, on the inseparability of social and environmental policy from economic developmentÐdevelop-ment, not in the sense of growth and profit, but in the older meaning of providing efficiently for basic human needs.
While there is already some support for social clauses within member states of the EU, their accomplishment is a formidable task. Not all political economists concerned with globalization consider pursuing their inclusion in trade and investment agreements a viable strategy, arguing that we lack a sufficiently developed global policy to make them workable (Amin, 1997) . But if the social clause initiative is seen partly as a social marketing counter-message to neoliberalism, confronting trade delegations and the world press on the social and ecological obligations of trade and investment policies, it remains an important and necessary, if not necessarily sufficient, strategy.
A PR O PO SA L TO BU I LD A PU BLI C HE ALT H LO BBY IN G PRE SEN CE
The long-term goal of this proposal is to establish healthy public policies (social clauses) within current and future world trade/investment agreements. The immediate objectives are:
(i) to create a health NGO lobby presence at the WTO, specifically around its biennial Ministerial Conferences, and at whatever regulatory body assumes responsibilities for the MAI, and (ii) to work alongside the efforts of other public interest NGOs, especially those representing development concerns in poorer nations.
There is also a role for national public health and other equity-oriented national NGOs to pressure members of their own country's trade delegation to the WTO or MAI negotiations. However, if the goal is to establish global policies restricting the unhealthy practices of global capital, an international health NGO, or group of such NGOs, is required, and for three reasons:
(i) to speak with the authority of a global voice; (ii) to ensure some degree of global consensus and equity in articulating that voice, i.e. to avoid a public health imperialism by activist individuals and groups from wealthier nations; and (iii) to support national public health associations and other grass roots organizations in building local constituencies where alternatives to the neoliberal free trade/investment regime might be discussed and advanced politically.
Several potential groups might play a lead role. The World Federation of Public Health Associations, an NGO umbrella of national public health associations, may be well positioned, as is the International Union for Health Promotion and Education. Others could include the International Peoples Health Council, a loosely structured network of primary health care reformers, and any of a number of physician groups, such as Physicians for Global Responsibility. There is no shortage of organizations or networks. Rather, there is generally a shortage of resources to buy the human time required to mobilize them, for it is unrealistic to assume that a meaningful health lobbying role could be exercised without logistical and staff expenses. Fortunately, there are considerable policy analysis and lobbying skills residing within several national public health or related organizations, independent policy groups, university-based public health and health promotion research centres (e.g. the network of WHO collaborating centres) and, most importantly, international public interest NGOs.
The task becomes one of creating a nodal point or group that might begin to strategize around the ideas in this proposal, assemble the policy and evidence-based arguments, and loosely co-ordinate the efforts of national health groups. Already, four national public health associations (Canada, Aotearoa/New Zealand, Australia and the UK) have passed or are considering resolutions on this issue, or are otherwise working to deepen an analysis of the`social clause' strategy and develop national and international lobbying opportunities. These tasks are made easier by ongoing innovations in computers and electronic communication, and a list-serv already exists for discussion of the ideas in this proposal.
To conclude my proposal, then, I am seeking the following: (i) helpful ideas about the general argument in this paper; (ii) contact information on any organizations and individuals willing to advance work on it; and (iii) an organization willing to support the initial development of an international health NGO presence at the WTO.
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